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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

MARK JOHN UNOPULOS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 940311-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f), whereby a defendant in a district
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a
first degree or capital felony.

See also Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2) (a) .

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or
in Addendum A:
Utah R. Crim. P. 16
Utah R. Evid. 702
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

If a police officer remains unlisted as a State witness

until the day of trial and the defense is denied access to evidence
critical to cross-examination of the officer, does the admitted

discovery violation require the court to prohibit the officer from
testifying about the undisclosed evidence?
A trial court's interpretation of the rule relating to
discovery, Utah R. Crim. P. 16, is reviewed for correctness.

State

v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 472 (Utah App. 1993) ("The trial court's
decision that the State was not required by Rule 16 to give such
notice before trial was a legal conclusion, and we therefore review
that conclusion for correctness").

Admission of the expert

testimony, though, is an issue of discretion.1

See Tennyson, 850

P.2d at 471 ("The trial court possesses discretion as to the
appropriateness of expert testimony in a specific case,.

This court

'will not reverse that determination on appeal in the "absence of a
clear showing of abuse"'").

1. Admissibility decisions have recently come under
further scrutiny. While an admissibility decision is a question of
law, see State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n.ll (Utah 1993),
the critical question, and one of some subtlety,
arises only after we have said that an issue is a
question of law and no deference is owed the trial
court. At this point, we must attempt to determine
when the articulated legal rule to be applied to a set
of facts--a rule that we establish without deference
to the trial courts--embodies a de facto grant of
discretion which permits the trial court to reach one
of several possible conclusions about the legal effect
of a particular set of facts without risking reversal.
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1994) (the degree of
discretion given a trial judge who applies a legal principle to the
facts of a case is analogized to the size of a pasture which,
depending on the circumstances, may range from being quite narrow to
extremely broad; see also id. at 937-38 (while the size of the
pasture for the admission of evidence is considerable, the standard
of review for the legal issue is ultimately one of law).
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2.

Was expert testimony on acceleration improperly admitted

to suggest an intent to injure when markings on the defendant's tires
may have been produced elsewhere?
"When addressing the admissibility of expert testimony, a
trial court must determine whether there is a sufficient foundation
for the expert's opinion.

'The trial court is allowed considerable

latitude of discretion in the admissibility of expert testimony, and
in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, this court will not
reverse."

State v. Pendergrass, 803 P.2d 1261, 1265 (Utah App. 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for

aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-103, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick,
presiding.

(R 123). On March 16, 1994, a jury found Mr. Mark J.

Unopulos guilty of the above offense (which involved Kyle Bateman).
(R 110-12).

The jury was unpersuaded in regards to two other

allegations, though, finding Mr. Unopulos not guilty of similar
charges against Margie Bateman and Madison Bateman.
On April 22, 1994, the court sentenced Mr. Unopulos to an
indeterminate term of zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison
together with various court-ordered amounts.

(R 123). The court

then stayed the sentence and placed Mr. Unopulos on probation for
eighteen months.

(R 123-24; 152-54).
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 13, 1993, Mark John Unopulos and his fourteen-year
old son spent most of the day " [r]eplacing the clutch in [Mark's]
'74 Ford pickup and adjusting the brakes."

(R 334; Transcript of

Trial [IfTf!] , page 176) . Mark was concerned with "shifting problems
with [the transmission], the grinding to get into gear and stuff."
(R 359; T 201) .
After working on the aged pickup, he drove north on 10th
West where he tested the brakes and clutch.

(R 357-58; T 199-200) .

Mark approached the intersection of 10th West and Fourth South,
"going fairly fast . . . [when he] noticed [a] white car . . .
[near] the middle of the intersection, . . . "

(R 336; T 178).

"I

[Mark Unopulos] was hard braking to stop for the stop sign and I
noticed [the driver of the white car,] Mr. Bateman reach over his
wife and he was quite angry and he gave me a finger gesture."
(R 336; T 178). Karl Lee Bateman, his wife Margie Lynn, and their
daughter Madison were in the white car, a 1993 Festiva.

(R 246-49;

T 88-91) .
Mark denied running the stop sign, (R 337, T 179), but
Margie Bateman testified that he went "a couple feet" into the
intersection.

(R 237; T 79). Karl Bateman also claimed that Mark

came within "[m]aybe three feet" of his car.

(R 249; T 91).

Although Margie screamed and Karl swerved into another lane, Karl
said he was not angry at Mark for almost hitting his family in his
brand new Festiva.

(R 249, 262-63; T 91, 104-05).
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In response to the finger gesture and cussing -- actions
denied by the Batemans -- Mark turned his pickup around and drove
after the departing Festiva.

(R 367, T 209). According to Karl

Bateman, "he [Mark] made that turn coming out of 10th West on Fourth
South, he left a black mark of rubber and I could see the tires
peeling as he swung around, so I figured there was going to be some
kind of a problem, so that's why I immediately took a right on Post,
pulled over, got out of the vehicle."

(R 251; T 93). Karl also

noticed Mark shrug, putting "his hands in the air when I [Karl]
glanced at him . . . [1]ike maybe he made a mistake or something."
(R 264; T 106).
Mark lost sight of the Festiva because the corner of Post
Street was obstructed by garbage piled high on the sidewalks in
anticipation of the city clean up.

(R 257-58, 339; T 99-100, 181).

Karl acknowledged the existence of garbage located in front of where
he had parked, although there was disagreement as to whether it
amounted to a visual obstruction.

(R 258, 260; T 100, 102) (Karl

claimed that he parked between the third and fourth house from the
corner and "just in front of [him] would have been a garbage pile"
consisting of "brush and I remember there was a TV in it[,] . . .
maybe a couch or a chair or something").

However, Karl's claimed

parking spot differed from the location pinpointed by his wife and a
number of eyewitnesses residing on Post Street.

(R 215, 218; T 57,

60) (Ordin Broadbent, a resident on Post Street, testified that the
Festiva parked about 15 feet from the corner "in between the first
house and the second house"); (R 310; T 152) (the person living on
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the corner lot of Post Street, Kent Hay, testifed that the Festiva
parked in front of his house bordering his neighbor); (R 241; T 83)
(Margie Bateman testified their Festiva stopped in front of "the
second house" from the corner); (R 204, 208; T 46, 50) (Rose
Anderson, another resident on Post Street, stated that the car
stopped in front of the second house).
When Mark's pickup "came around this corner, the back end
of the truck started to fishtail, . . .

[I] start[ed] to lose it,

. . . and then the steering just locked into an arcing curve toward
the west."

(R 341; T 183). Although travelling only about

25-35 m.p.h., the truck was going too fast for the corner given its
steering and alignment problems.

(R 365, 375-76; T 207, 217-18).

Mark was unable to control the truck's speed and direction and it
ended up glancing off the left front section of the Festiva.
(R 275, 342; T 117, 184).
Although the slight blow to the car was not enough to harm
passengers Margie Lynn or daughter Madison, the child, screamed and
was shakened by the incident.

(R 254-55; T 96-97).

Karl Bateman,

who had previously exited the Festiva to confront Mr. Unopulos, was
not struck by the truck but claimed that he almost was hit standing
in front of his car.

(R 251, T 93) .

Karl argued that the Ford pickup had accelerated towards
him and he "darted across the front corner of" the Festiva to avoid
the collision.

(R 252; T 94). However, Karl also testified that a

truck with manual steering and alignment problems could lock up
going around a corner.

(R 270-72; T 112-14); see also (R 272;
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T 114) (Karl happened to be an employee of the Ford company).

"If

it [the steering] locks and it binds over into one direction or the
other, it's going to stay in that direction.

Its not going to be

easy to correct before or after an accident."

(R 272; T 114)

(testimony of Karl Bateman).
The corroborative testimony of Joe Jiron, a mechanic who
examined Mark's pickup, was offered as follows:
the State would be willing to stipulate that Joe
Richard Jiron, if called, would testify that he
examined the truck belonging to the Defendant on the
25th of February of this year [1994], that he observed
that it had been some time since service work had been
done on the steering on that vehicle, that he drove
the truck for approximately 12 blocks, that the
steering was of a poor quality, and that he found a
problem with the alignment on the truck, that there
was a potential for the steering to lock up, that he
found the brakes to be okay, that he has no knowledge
or had no knowledge of the condition of the truck on
the 13th of July of 1993, and that we don't have
evidence as to the qualifications of Mr. Jiron as a
mechanic.
(R 332; T 174).
Following the collision, Mark panicked and drove home
without stopping.

(R 34 8; T 190). He awaited the arrival of the

police who had traced the license plate number to his address.
(R 3 82; T 224). Mark cooperated with the investigation and was
eventually arrested.

(R 349-50; T 191-92).

The State charged Mr. Unopulos with three counts of
aggravated assault.
car).

(R 79-80) (one count for each occupant in the

After the jury was selected and during a break before opening

arguments, the State for the first time informed defense counsel
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that it wanted to call Rose Jones, an officer involved in the case,
to testify about tire track evidence purportedly found near the
scene but not mentioned in any of the police reports.

(R 279;

T 121) .
The State admitted that officer Jones was not present at
the preliminary hearing and that it did not plan to use her at
trial.

(R 281, 283; T 123, 125). Nevertheless, at trial the State

attempted to call officer Jones to support its theory that
Mr. Unopulos had accelerated his truck into the white Festiva.
(R 279; T 121).
The court initially ruled against the State.
T 127).

(R 285;

Since most of the State's case had already been presented,

the court held:
wholly aside from the problematical question of
whether or not a Salt Lake City police officer could
qualify under Rule 702 for purposes of providing
expert testimony, wholly aside from that, and that is
problematical, it seems to me that the proffered
testimony of the officer [Jones] is more in the nature
of corroboration and/or cumulative to what's already
been testified to, and it seems moreover to me that
given the fact that the additional testimony came as a
surprise to both the Prosecution and certainly to the
Defense, and moreover, Mr. Blaylock [the prosecutor],
that your intent was to proceed with this trial even
without knowing that additional information, that to
avoid the potential of creating error here which might
well result in a reversal in the event there's a
conviction, it seems to me that it's probably
reasonable at this point to exclude that aspect of the
officer's testimony.
(R 284-85; T 126-27) . Notwithstanding its prior ruling, the court
later changed its mind and allowed officer Jones to testify after
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deeming her qualified as an expert witness.

(R 387, 392; T 229,

234) .
Jones testified that she photographed tire marks discovered
near the scene -- apparently revealing acceleration, yet the officer
declined to disclose that fact in her report because, in her
opinion, they "didn't turn out very well that you could see very
much in them."

(R 391; T 233). Due to the nondisclosure, however,

Mr. Unopulos did not have the opportunity to either examine the
photographs or to determine independently whether he could use
them.

(R 393, T 235).
Jones also testified about other purported signs of

acceleration found near the scene: fresh rubber scraped off the
street by Jones with her fingernail.

(R 416; T 258) .

That

evidence, however, was not kept by Jones nor was her discovery
reported to the defense.

(R 416; T 258). While such evidence may

constitute one method for determining the freshness of rubber, other
methods potentially available to Mr. Unopulos could not be addressed
on cross-examination because Jones had discarded the evidence and
prevented further analysis.

(R 416; T 258) .

Officer Jones, the chief investigating official for the
collision, acknowledged that the thoroughness of her report may be
at issue before a judge or jury.

(R 422; T 264).

"That's why I

made extra notes [,]" officer Jones argued in apparent reference to
her three or four page police report.

(R 417, 422; T 259, 264).

However, the report prepared by Jones and the supplemental reports
from other officers all failed to mention the physical evidence of
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acceleration now suddenly relied on by the State for the purpose of
persuading the jury at trial,

(R 279, 283; T 121, 125).

Interestingly, Jones herself conceded that when a finding
is omitted from her police report, a reasonable assumption would be
that the matter did not come to light.

(R 381; T 223).

For

example, in regards to the gestures by Karl Bateman, officer Jones
testified, "I don't recall asking him that [about the gestures].
it's not here [in the police report], I probably did not."
T 223) (emphasis added).

If

(R 381;

Similarly, since Jones' police report said

nothing about the physical evidence of acceleration, the officer's
omission was consistent with Mr. Unopulos' belief that no such
evidence existed and that nothing additional would be presented.
(R 393; T 235).
At trial, however, Officer Jones announced for the first
time that, in her opinion, the physical evidence showed acceleration
had occurred just prior to the collision.

(R 400; T 242) .

Jones

also testified that marks found on the tires of Mark's pickup were
consistent with acceleration.

(R 3 97; T 239). Due to the unknown

and undisclosed nature of the physical evidence, Mr. Unopulos was
unable to properly respond to Jones' surprise evidence.
Following Jones' testimony, the jury concluded that Mark
Unopulos had "intentionally and knowingly assaulted Karl
Bateman [.]"

(R 102). Mark was convicted of one count of aggravated

assault and found not guilty on the aggravated assault charges
pertaining to Margie Bateman and Madison Bateman.
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(R 110-12) .

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State violated the discovery requirements when it
failed to list a police officer as a witness until the morning of
trial.

Mark Unopulos was unable to respond to the officer's

testimony concerning physical evidence discovered near the scene of
a collision (photographs of tire markings, marks observed on tires
which were consistent with acceleration, rubber allegedly scraped
off the street) because such evidence was never disclosed beforehand
notwithstanding specific requests by the defense to do so.
Mr. Unopulos' ability to defend himself was prejudiced by
the fact that the State's physical evidence was no longer available
or had since been destroyed.

Having been denied access to or

disclosure of the physical evidence, Mr. Unopulos was hampered in
his ability to impeach the officer's "expertise" or to call experts
of his own.
Police officer Rose Jones should not have ever been allowed
to testify as an expert witness. Her expressed opinion, that
Mr. Unopulos had accelerated his truck into another car, was
unfounded given the lack of information available to her.

Jones

based her opinion in part on the condition of the pickup's tires,
which indicated that acceleration had recently occurred.

Since

acceleration had also apparently occurred at or near the scene of
the collision, Jones simply assumed that the markings and the
pickup's tires were linked.

What Jones did not know, however, was

that acceleration had occurred in locations other than the scene of
the collision.

Officer Jones' opinion lacked the necessary
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evidentiary reliability and failed to assist the trier of fact in
determining what had happened at the time of impact.

The unknown

and undisclosed nature of the officer's testimony should have been
excluded at trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DUE TO THE STATE'S ADMITTED DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS, THE
COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING A POLICE OFFICER TO TESTIFY
ABOUT EVIDENCE WHICH HAD NOT BEEN DISCLOSED TO THE
DEFENSE AND WHICH WAS LIKELY TO INFLUENCE THE JURY
Discovery requirements are set forth in part by Rule 16,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states, inter alia:
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor
shall disclose to the defense upon request the
following material or information of which he has
knowledge:
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant
or codefendant;
(4) evidence know to the prosecutor that tends to
negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the
guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of
the offense for the reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court
determines on good cause shown should be made
available to the defendant in order for the
defendant to adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon
as practicable following the filing of charges and
before the defendant is required to plead.
The
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure.

(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the
prosecutor or defense may make disclosure by notifying
the opposing party that material and information may
be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable
times and places.
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(g) If at any time during the course of the
proceedings it is brought to the attention of the
court that a party has failed to comply with this
rule, the court may order such party to permit the
discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or
prohibit the party from introducing evidence not
disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it
deems just under the circumstances.
Utah R. Crim. P. 16.
In the case at bar, counsel for Mr. Unopulos requested the
State to provide "[a] list of all the witnesses that the State
intends to call for trial in the above-entitled matter, their
addresses, telephone numbers and criminal records."

(R 19); cf.

State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 1987) (such requests
"specifically and unmistakably [seek] disclosure of [Utah R. Crim.
P. 16](a)(5) material consisting of the names and addresses of
witnesses and their statements").

When a specific request is made,

the duty of the prosecutor is clear:
Since the defense made a specific request in
compliance with the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the prosecution had a duty to respond. The
prosecution could respond by providing the information
or by stating that it would not provide the
information. If the prosecution refused to provide
the information, the defense could then move the court
to compel discovery. But if the prosecution ignored
the discovery request, or only partially responded to
it, the requesting party could then logically infer
that the information was not provided because it did
not exist. See Knight, 734 P.2d at 917 (citing United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (1985)
(recognizing the possibility that an incomplete
response to a discovery request may mislead the
defense and impair the adversary process)).
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Salt Lake City v. Reynolds; 849 P.2d 582 (Utah App. 1993) .
Despite Mr. Unopulos7 specific request, the actions or
inactions of the prosecution led him to believe that officer Rose
Jones would not be called as an expert witness.
never listed as a State witness.

Officer Jones was

Jones did not testify at the

preliminary hearing and the State even acknowledged that it first
became aware of her "tire markings" testimony only during the
morning of trial.

(R 281; T 123); see also (R 279; T 121) (the

State and Mr. Unopulos both agreed that officer Jones' police report
did not indicate her observance or interpretation of brake or
acceleration marks); accord (R 422; T 264) (officer Jones herself
admitted she did not mention tire tracks or marks in the police
reports).

The State further admitted that it had every intention of

proceeding without her at trial.

(R 283; T 125). The State's own

concessions evidenced its failure to disclose Rose Jones as a
prosecution witness.
Accordingly, the trial judge decided to "exclude her
[officer Jones] - - o r prevent her from testifying regarding tire
track evidence [.]"

(R 280; T 122). The court initially held:

wholly aside from the problematical question of
whether or not a Salt Lake City police officer could
qualify under Rule 702 for purposes of providing
expert testimony, wholly aside from that, and that is
problematical, it seems to me that the proffered
testimony of the officer [Jones] is more in the nature
of corroboration and/or cumulative to what's already
been testified to, and it seems moreover to me that
given the fact that the additional testimony came as a
surprise to both the Prosecution and certainly to the
Defense, and moreover, Mr. Blaylock [the prosecutor],
that your intent was to proceed with this trial even
without knowing that additional information, that to
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avoid the potential of creating error here which might
well result in a reversal in the event there's a
conviction, it seems to me that it's probably
reasonable at this point to exclude that aspect of the
officer's testimony.
(R 284-85; T 126-27).
The court's ruling is in accordance with Rule 16(g) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

"If at any time during the course

of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that
a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may . . .
prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, . . ."
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(g) (emphasis added).

Further support stems from

Rule 16(a)(5), a good cause determination implicit in the court's
ruling that the excluded testimony encompassed evidence which should
have been "made available to the defendant in order for the
defendant to adequately prepare his defense."

Utah R. Crim.

P. (a) (5) . Not only did the State violate discovery mandates by not
listing officer Jones as a prosecution witness, the content of her
testimony constituted surprise evidence; Jones' qualifications as an
expert witness on tire markings were questionable; and Mark Unopulos
was left unable to conduct an investigation of his own.
T 121-30) .

(R 279-88;

The court's preliminary ruling was well supported.

At no time during the trial did Mr. Unopulos' disadvantaged
position change.

In fact, further discovery violations became

apparent when, over objection from defense counsel, officer Jones
began testifying on rebuttal.

(R 384; T 226). Although in conflict

with its earlier ruling, the court allowed the State to "proceed
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with the examination [of Jones until] the time that you [counsel for
Mr. Unopulos] feels it's objectionable."

(R 384; T 226).

Officer Jones testified about her background (classes on
and investigation of homicide and traffic cases).
T 226-28) .

(R 384-86;

However, as soon as Jones broached the very same

evidentiary matters which the court had earlier excluded,
Mr. Unopulos objected.

(R 3 84; T 228) .

Despite Mr. Unopulos' objections, (R 3 84; T 22 8) (on the
grounds "previously noted" including his alternative motions for a
continuance or mistrial, [R 281, 284; T 123, 126]), the court ruled
merely that Jones qualified as an "expert witness". 2

(R 387;

T 229). Nothing in the court's changed ruling, however, addressed
the still existing concerns regarding the State's nondisclosure of
officer Jones as a prosecution witness, the surprise nature of her
testimony on tire markings, and, through no fault of his own, the
foreclosed ability of Mr. Unopulos to defend himself against officer
Jones' contentions.

(R 279-88; T 121-30).

The court nevertheless allowed Jones to continue testifying
even when further discovery violations were revealed.

Rule 16

requires the prosecution to disclose "physical evidence seized from
the defendant", evidence that tends to negate or mitigate guilt or
the degree of the offense, or any other item of evidence which, for

2. The court ruled, "it seems to me that there's
sufficient foundation laid under Rule 702 that this witness has had
considerable investigation experience, three to five per day for a
period of four years. She's taken adequate training for purposes of
qualifying herself, and I'm convinced and persuaded she's qualified
in her area of expertise."
(R 387; T 229). But see infra Point II.
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good cause, should be made available to the defendant in order to
adequately prepare his defense.

Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a)(3)-(5).

Prior to trial, Mark Unopulos specifically requested "[a]ny
photographs of physical evidence taken from the alleged crime scene
or taken by any law enforcement officer during the course of the
investigation of the above-entitled case by any police agency[.]"
(R 20) .

No photographs of tire markings were produced, however,

notwithstanding officer Jones' admission at trial that on the day in
question she did in fact photograph tire marks at or near the scene
of the collision.

(R 391; T 233) .

Officer Jones' photographs of the involved tire marks were
neither made available nor alluded to in her police report because,
in Jones' opinion, they "didn't turn out very well that you could
see very much in them."

(R 391; T 233). Jones' assertion, however,

was an inadequate response which led Mr. Unopulos to believe that
such evidence did not exist, see Knight, 734 P.2d at 917, and the
officer's inactions deprived Unopulos of the opportunity to decide
for himself whether the photographs had exculpatory or mitigating
value.

(R 393, T 235).
Also omitted from Jones' police report were her results or

findings relevant to the condition of the pickup's tires.

In his

requests for discovery, Mark Unopulos sought " [r]eports or
descriptions . . . from defendant's person or . . . vehicle that the
State intends to use at trial."
provided.

(R 20). No such information was

At trial, though, officer Jones offered for the first

time information undisclosed and unknown to Mr. Unopulos.
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[Officer Jones:] We examined the tires when we
brought [Mr. Unopulos'] truck out of the driveway and
they lifted it up to get it on the tow truck so I
could get right under and look, rotate them, look at
the marks on the tires, see where the rubber from the
tire was left on the roadway.
Q

And what did you find?

A We found it was clean off, it had been accelerated
off and braked off.
The sides -- okay, the sides of the tire, if you're
looking at a tire this way, this angle, the sides were
very, very smooth to indicate the skids. Almost
half-way around the tire, really heavy, the other
half-way around, heavy to indicate acceleration. The
smoothness left there is inconsistent with the other
tires that were involved.
(R 412-13; T 254-55) .

Having no knowledge beforehand of such

evidence, on cross-examination Mr. Unopulos was left unarmed trying
to decipher the officer's jargon rather than exposing flaws or gaps
in the witness' perceptions and interpretations.

(R 4 04-16;

T 246-58) .
One other discovery violation was brought to the court's
attention through officer Jones' testimony.

Officer Jones testified

that she scraped fresh rubber off the street as part of a test to
determine whether acceleration had occurred, but she then discarded
the evidence without even mentioning the discovery in the police
report.

(R 415-16; T 257-58).

Instead of finding an inadequate

response to Mr. Unopulos' discovery request for "[a]ny reports or
results of scientific tests taken during the investigation of this
caselj"

(R 20), the court altered its prior ruling and attempted to

support it on the following grounds:
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When this matter first came to my attention at the
beginning of the trial yesterday morning, I think both
counsel were just at that point aware of the
additional information the officer may well have
available. At our discussion at that time, I
indicated I would preclude the officer from testifying
in the State's case in chief for the reason that there
may well be an issue about her qualification as an
expert under Rule 702, and additionally, the question
about not knowing what the Defendant's testimony would
be. Therefore, I stated that I would not allow the
State to call this officer as a witness in the case in
chief but that I would reserve the question of whether
or not she would be allowed as a rebuttal witness
dependent upon the Defendant's testimony.
The Defendant took the stand and testified
essentially that his car was out of control at the
time he turned the corner, that it locked up and made
no acceleration.
It seemed to me, therefore, that the calling of the
officer was appropriate in terms of rebuttal.
In addition, in the State's response to the request
for discovery in the file, the State indicated that
there may well be other information in police agency
files which is not available to or in the possession
of the County Attorney, and in your own copy of the
report, [Counsel for Mr. Unopulos], the term
accelerated and the observation that the Defendant
accelerated prior to the impact is contained therein.
It seems, therefore, to me that the Defense was on
notice, but particularly on notice in terms of the
rebuttal usage of this officer. It seemed to me that
it was appropriate and therefore, I simply am stating
my position on the record with a little more
particularity.
(R 430-31; T 272-73).
Despite the court's position, the reasons for changing its
decision remain legally inadequate.

The flaws in each reason are

discussed below, except for the matter concerning whether Officer
Jones was unqualified to testify as an expert witness on tire
tracks, an issue addressed separately in Print II.
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The court's decision to allow officer Jones as a rebuttal
witness should not have been dependent upon Mark Unopulos'
testimony.

(R 431; T 273). Unopulos' right to testify and to

present his own defense is an entitlement3 distinct from the
decision to exclude Jones as a State witness.

Cf. Semper v. Santos,

845 F.2d 1233, 1288 (3rd Cir. 1988) (in Semper, "had [the physician]
been permitted to testify [as an expert witness on rebuttal], Semper
[the nondisclosing party] 'would have profitted from [his] own
failure to comply with the discovery deadlines,' since defendants
would have been prejudiced").

The nature of Mr. Unopulos' defense

should not have been limited by a court reservation which in essence
said: be careful about how you defend yourself or the State will be
able to use information unknown and undisclosed to you.

(R 431;

T 273) .
Where, as here, the State admits that it had planned to
proceed to trial without officer Jones' testimony, (R 283; T 125),
the need for a rebuttal witness is diminished.

For instance, in

State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1993), "a rebuttal
witness whose need could not reasonably have been anticipated" was
allowed to testify.

>Id.

at 472.

" [T] he State was unaware until

defendant [Tennyson] testified that he was basing his defense on
intoxication."

^Id. at 464.

The State in Tennyson "appropriately

responded to an exigency at trial" by calling an expert witness "to

3. Cf. Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1981)
("The well-recognized general rule entitles a party to have his
theory of the case submitted to the jury").
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rebut defendant's testimony concerning the amount of alcohol he
drank on the night in question."

Id. at 472-73.

By comparison, no exigency existed in Mr. Unopulos' case
and the State was aware of his defense.

(R 285; T 127). From the

time of the preliminary hearing until the end of the State's case in
chief at trial, the State's witnesses and theory of acceleration
remained consistent.

(R 11-12; R 200-303).

Equally consistent was

Mr. Unopulos' defense, unaltered even through the close of trial
when Mark refused to compromise the prospect of a complete acquittal
with the insertion of a lesser included offense.

(R 432; T 274).

The State's use of Jones as a rebuttal witness was nothing more than
an improper "back-door attempt to bolster the case-in-chief."
Semper v. Santos, 845 F.2d 1233, 1288 (3rd Cir. 1988) .
The court also reasoned that while other information may
have existed in police files', because the police report in question
included the term "accelerated" the defense should have known that
officer Jones could be called in rebuttal.

(R 431; T 273). Not

only did the court's prior ruling contradict this newfound
rationale, the parties themselves fairly read the reports to exclude
such notice of acceleration.
Officer Jones' police report merely stated, "Victim vehicle
stopped along curb line on the west side of Post [Street].
Complainant exited victim vehicle to attempt to find help.
Complainant was barely out of the vehicle door when suspect vehicle
accelerated and drove directly towards complainant."
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(R 424; T 266).

Based on these statements, the State and Mr. Unopulos both
agreed that officer Jones' police report did not indicate either her
observance or interpretation of brake or acceleration marks.
(R 279; T 121).

In addition, officer Jones herself admitted that

she did not mention tire tracks or marks in the police reports.
(R 422; T 264).

She further stated that she was not present to

independently witness the incident and that after Mr. Bateman had
voiced the above story to her, Jones in turn recorded ministerially
those statements in her report.

(R 424-25; T 266-67).

Other than

summarizing the complainant's claims, officer Jones' report was
devoid of any mention of her new contentions that she had
photographed, observed, and touched the tire marks herself.
The lower court's strained reading to the contrary is in
error.

Officer Jones' police report gave the defense no notice that

she would advance her own expert opinion on tire markings discovered
near the scene or as reflected on Mr. Unopulos' vehicle.
Consequently, Mr. Unopulos was unable to call his own expert
witnesses in response to and in defense of Jones' claimed and
unexpected "expertise".

(R 392-93).

Cf. Salt Lake City v.

Reynolds, 849 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah App. 1993) (because the
prosecution violated discovery by not saying anything about a State
witness' criminal record, defendant Reynolds did not have to respond
by moving to compel evidence which he reasonably believed did not
exist).
The impact of officer Jones' testimony was perhaps best
summarized by the prosecution itself.
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When the court first

considered whether to include officer Jones as an expert witness,
the court decided to exclude Jones following a State acknowledgment
that the officer's testimony involved "physical evidence, and
physical evidence would tend to be maybe a little more persuasive
than verbal evidence."

(R 283; T 125).

Indeed, prior to officer

Jones' testimony on the undisclosed evidence, the case was simply a
verbal credibility determination with one party arguing an
accidentical collision while the other argued criminal assault.
However, when the officer offered the previously
undisclosed and unknown physical evidence, the State's case
strengthened two-fold.

First, the physical evidence testimony

bolstered its case in chief.

Second, Mr. Unopulos' case weakened

before the jury since he could not counter the officer's claims of
physical evidence with prepared cross-examination or expert
witnesses of his own.

An independent investigation of the physical

evidence was stymied by both the nondisclosure of its existence and
its subsequent destruction.
The tires on Mr. Unopulos' truck were not held in evidence
to determine if the wear and tear was in fact consistent with
acceleration; the tire markings on the street were not available for
viewing either in person or by photograph because, in officer Jones'
opinion, they "didn't turn out very well that you could see very
much in them."

(R 391; T 233). Analysis of the rubber scraped off

the street could not be undertaken as officer Jones disgarded the
evidence.
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The court's changed ruling should be reversed.

Mark

Unopulos' position at trial did not alter the State's theory of
acceleration, nor did his testimony produce an "exigency"
unanticipated by the State.

In contrast, since a war of words and

attacks on credibility constituted the only concern for
Mr. Unopulos, the undisclosed physical evidence testimony added
matters beyond the scope of his prepared defense and resulted in an
exigency to which he could not respond.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT OFFICER ROSE
JONES WAS QUALIFIED TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT WITNESS
ABOUT EVIDENCE CRITICAL TO THE JURY BUT BEYOND THE
SCOPE OF THE OFFICER1S KNOWLEDGE
"Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that a
witness may qualify as an expert by reason of his or her knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education to give opinion evidence
regarding scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge."
Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993); Utah R. Evid. 702.

If a

party fails to lay an appropriate foundation for expert testimony,
the expert witness is precluded from testifying.

See State v.

Pendergrass, 803 P.2d 1261 (Utah App. 1990).
In Pendergrass, for example, expert testimony was excluded
as being inadequately based and overly speculative.

Even though the

experts, a psychologist and a psychiatrist, were otherwise versed on
the subject of multiple drug ingestion and its effects on a person's
state of mind, they did not know enough about the specific situation
involving defendant Pendergrass to formulate reliable opinions
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concerning his mental state.

Id. at 1265.

"While there was

testimony as to the types and total amounts of drugs in the
possession of defendant [Pendergrass] and the victim on May 27,
there was insufficient evidence as to the actual amounts consumed by
defendant, the timing of the consumption, the purity of the drugs,
and defendant's tolerance level."

_Id. at 1266.

testimony was deemed properly excluded.

The expert

Id.

In Mr. Unopulos' case, the basis for officer Jones'
"expert" testimony similarly lacked the information necessary for a
well informed opinion.

Officer Jones testified about courses she

had taken in traffic investigation.

(R 387-91; T 229-33) .

The

officer was taught to diagram tire marks and to use different
formulas for analyzing evidence.

(R 390; T 232).

In her

investigation here, however, officer Jones neglected to diagram the
tire marks in the reports and her photographs of the markings were
summarily discounted.

(R 3 91; T 233) .

Under "optimum" conditions with good brakes, good friction,
and a right temperature on the road surface, tire markings could be
interpreted to reflect a perceived driving pattern.

(R 402; T 244).

According to Jones, skid marks and acceleration marks differ in the
darkness of the color, the squiggly (versus solid) nature of the
markings, and the length of the tire track involved.
T 240-42).

(R 398-400;

The road conditions at the time of the collision were

not optimal, however, requiring adjustments in the applicable
analysis.

(R 403; T 245).
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Fueling officer Jones' evaluation were the complaints
expressed by the Batemans that acceleration had occurred.
T 269).

(R 427;

In the officer's own words, "When I [Jones] first arrived

at the scene, the Batemans came up to me and they were so upset and
said the guy hit them, he tried to hit them[.]"

(R 419; T 261).

Pursuant to their statements, Jones claimed to then have noticed
marks near the scene of the collision which were reflective of
acceleration.

(R 417; T 259). Factors not incorporated into the

officer's decision, however, included the specific circumstances
involving Mark Unopulos and the mechanically unsound condition of
his truck.
Mr. Unopulos' 1974 pickup had not been serviced for an
extended period of time.

The truck was saddled with alignment

problems and the steering had the potential to lock up.
T 174) .

(R 332;

Uninformed as to these considerations, the officer failed

to realize the likelihood that acceleration marks resulted from a
mechanically deficient truck "fishtailing" out of control around a
corner.

(R 341; T 183). Mark Unopulos admitted that his speed of

25-35 m.p.h. may have been too fast for the situation, (R 3 67,
375-76; T 209; 217-18), but Jones' investigation omitted such
factors.
In any event, little evidentiary reliability exists in an
officer's identification of "just a scuff", (R 413; T 255), a
claimed acceleration mark discovered near a well travelled street
like Fourth South.

Officer Jones herself noted that Fourth South is

"a busily travelled roadway."

(R 415; T 257). A scuff mark found
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near a corner intersection of a busy thoroughfare establishes merely
that numerous cars had turned there before the accident.
Further reason for pause stems from the unpreserved or
destroyed status of the evidence.

See, e.g., (R 391; T 233).

Verification and confirmation of Jones' purported findings cannot be
made independently even though, as the chief investigating officer,
(R 416; T 258), she knew that the thoroughness of her reported
findings may be brought before a judge or jury.

(R 422; T 264).

Unreliability and speculation clouded the entire officer's testimony.
The lack of good foundational grounds for expert testimony
was compounded by the fact that the officer's claims proved
confusing to the jury.

Cf. Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84

(Utah App. 1989) ("The critical factor is whether the expert has
knowledge that can assist the trier of fact in resolving the issues
before it").

Assuming, arguendo, that officer Jones was qualified

to testify as an expert, her opinion did not appropriately assist
the jury.
In State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1993), an
expert witness "was called specifically to rebut defendant's
testimony describing the amount of alcohol he drank on the night of
the burglary."

!Id. at 472.

With all relevant information before

him, the expert helped the jury realize "that if defendant drank
what he said he drank, his behavior on the night of the burglary
would have been much different than that described by another
witness."

Id.
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Officer Jones, however, did little to aid the jury in its
deliberations.

Jones testified that the tire markings found near

the scene of the collision on Post Street and the marks on the tires
of Mark Unopulos' pickup were both reflective of acceleration.
(R 397, 400; T 239, 242). Accordingly, Jones argued, Unopulos' must
have intended to accelerate his vehicle into the Bateman's Festiva
in a nonaccidental manner.

(R 410; T 252) .

However, acceleration marks discovered on the truck's tire
do not assist the jury under the present circumstances.

The

testimony by both parties reveal that acceleration did not occur at
an isolated time and place.

Mark Unopulos testified that after he

worked on the pickup's brakes, transmission, and clutch, he test
drove the truck by driving it in and around the city.

(R 251;

T 93). Braking and accelerating occurred.
Kyle Bateman also observed acceleration.

Bateman testified

that before the collision on Post Street, his car and the pickup
narrowly missed each other in another intersection.

(R 24 9; T 91).

According to Bateman, after the miss the pickup acclerated after
him.

"[H]e [Unopulos] made that turn coming out of 10th West on

Fourth South, he left a black mark of rubber and I could see the
[truck's] tires peeling as he swung around[.]"

(R 251; T 93).

Since both parties revealed that acceleration had occurred at
locations other than the scene of the collision, officer Jones'
testimony served only to confuse and mislead the jury on the very
determination at issue.

Jones' opinion, that the pickup had

accelerated into the Festiva, was improperly premised on the
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markings found on the truck's tires.

(R 410; T 252). Due to many

instances of acceleration, however, such an opinion was neither well
founded nor helpful to the jury's understanding of the issue.
Officer Jones' testimony should have been excluded.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Unopulos respectfully requests this Court to reverse
his conviction &nd remand the case for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this /%Q

day of November, 1994.

RONKLD SS F{JJINO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

RICHARD G. UDAY
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon request the following material or information of which he has
knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of
the offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the
defendant to adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case.
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and
places.
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order
as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to
make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the
court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or
it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to:
(1) appear in a lineup;
(2) speak for identification;
(3) submit tofingerprintingor the making of other bodily impressions;
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime;
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise;
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings,
and other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable
intrusion;
(7) provide specimens of handwriting;
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the
time of the alleged offense.
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall
be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to
comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and
shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem appropriate.

Rule 702- Testimony by experts.
If scientific technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

